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Abstract
A single-issue spatial election is a voter preference profile derived from an
arrangement of candidates and voters on a line, with each voter preferring the
nearer of each pair of candidates. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that
determines whether a given preference profile is a single-issue spatial election and,
if so, constructs such an election. This result also has preference representation
and mechanism design applications.
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1. Introduction.
We address the problem of determining whether voter preferences over a slate of can-
didates could have been formed solely on the basis of the candidates’ and voters’ positions
on a single issue. More exactly, given a finite slate of candidates, a finite electorate and
a voter preference profile in the form of a linear ordering of candidates for each voter, is
there an arrangement of the candidates and the voters on a line such that for any voter v
and candidates c and d, v prefers c to d if and only if the distance from v to c is less than
the distance from v to d?
Here the problem splits in two. In the first version of the problem, voters are allowed
to have different perceptions of distance. In particular, for points c, d and e in R with d
between c and e, two voters may disagree on whether d is nearer c or e, but must agree
that c is nearer d than e. A spatial representation as described above, in which voters are
allowed to have different perceptions of distance, is called a convex representation in R.
Equivalently, a convex representation in R is an arrangement of the candidates alone on a
line in such a way that for every voter v and candidate c, there is a convex set in R, that
is, an interval, that contains those candidates and only those candidates who are weakly
preferred to c by v.
Convex representations in R have also been called qualitative scales (Coombs, 1964),
and preferences convexly representable in R have been called ordinally single-peaked pref-
erences (Brams et al, 2002).
Bogomolnaia and Laslier (2007) provide a surprisingly simple answer for the
2-dimensional version of the above question: every preference profile is consistent with
voter preferences being formed on the basis of candidates’ positions on two issues. In
other words, every preference profile has a convex representation in R2.
Bartholdi and Trick (1986) produced a polynomial time algorithm to determine
whether a given voter preference profile has a convex representation in R. Ballester and
Haeringer (2007) then presented a simple characterization of convex representability in
R; they showed that a convex representation in R exists if and only if the given voter
preference profile does not contain as a subprofile either of two examples, one involving
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three voters and three candidates, and one involving two voters and four candidates.
The second version of the problem differs from the first version only in that voters are
required to share a common perception of distance. A spatial representation in R in which
voters are required to share a common perception of distance is called a Euclidean repre-
sentation in R. Euclidean representations in R have also been called quantitative scales
(Coombs, 1964); and preferences that have Euclidean representations inR have been called
cardinally single-peaked preferences (Brams et al, 2002). Bogomolnaia and Laslier (2007)
obtain some interesting results concerning Euclidean representations in higher dimensions.
Their results relevant to our problem appear in their Proposition 15, which in dimension 1
asserts the existence of a Euclidean representation in R if the number of voters is at most
two and the number of candidates is at most three, and also provides a two voter, four
candidate example with no Euclidean representation in R.
We will construct an algorithm that in polynomial time determines whether a given
voter preference profile possesses a Euclidean representation in R and, if so, constructs
such a representation. Here, “in polynomial time” means in a number of steps that is
polynomial in the number of candidates.
Besides the previously mentioned application, recognizing single-issue spatial elections,
and the obvious application, preference representation, our results have a mechanism design
application. Suppose you are planning a community along a stretch of road. You plan
to build homes and several amenities, such as a gym, a grocery store, a bowling alley,
etc. Each prospective home-buyer has ranked the amenities from likely-to-be-used-most-
often to likely-to-be-used-least-often. You would like to know if it is possible to place
the homes and amenities on the highway so that each homeowner is nearest his top-
ranked amenity, second nearest his second-ranked amenity, etc. Since in this context
homeowners will have the same perception of distance, we are looking for a Euclidean
representation in R. (Is there any meaningful interpretation for a convex representation
in R even though homeowners have a common perception of distance? Yes, there is. In a
convex representation, no homeowner ever has to drive past a less-often used amenity to
get to a more-often used amenity.)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of preliminaries.
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Sections 3 contains our result on Euclidean representations in R. Section 4 contains some
concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries.
Let I be a finite set of voters or, more generally, individuals. Let A = {aj}j∈J be a
finite slate of candidates or, more generally, a finite set of distinct alternatives, indexed
by J , a finite set of positive integers. We assume for convenience that no two voters have
identical preferences. Let R = (Ri)i∈I be an ordered |I|-tuple of distinct linear orders on
A. A linear order Ri on A is a complete, transitive, antisymmetric binary relation on A.
The expression ajRiak can be read “i weakly prefers aj to ak.” Alternative aj ∈ A is
Ri-minimal (Ri-maximal) if akRiaj (ajRiak) for all ak ∈ A. A linear order is essentially
a ranking of alternatives from the most preferred (Ri-maximal) to the least preferred (Ri-
minimal). Then (I, A,R) is a profile of linear orders.
For X ⊆ Rd , co(X) is the convex hull of X in Rd.
Definition 1. A convex representation in Rd for profile (I, A,R) is a set X = {xj}j∈J ⊆
Rd such that for all i ∈ I and xk ∈ X, the upper contour set Ui(xk) := {xj : ajRiak}
satisfies Ui(xk) = co(Ui(xk)) ∩X.
Definition 2. A Euclidean representation in Rd for profile (I, A,R) is an ordered pair
(X,W ) with X ∪W = {xj}j∈J ∪{wi}i∈I ⊆ Rd such that for i ∈ I and distinct aj , ak ∈ A,
ajRia
k if and only of ρ(xj , wi) < ρ(xk, wi), where ρ is Euclidean distance.
Definition 3. A profile of linear orders (I, A,R) is 3,3-twisted if there exist b, c, d ∈ I and
distinct ap, aq, ar ∈ A such that, among ap, aq and ar, ap is Rb-minimal, aq is Rc-minimal
and ar is Rd-minimal.
Definition 4. A profile of linear orders (I, A,R) is 2,4-twisted if there exist b, c ∈ I and
distinct ap, aq, ar, as ∈ A such that arRbaqRbap, apRcaqRcar, asRbaq and asRcaq.
Proposition 1. (Ballester and Haeringer, 2007) A profile of linear orders (I, A,R) has a
convex representation in R if and only if it is neither 3,3-twisted nor 2,4-twisted.
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A family of problems (Q(n)) is an infinite sequence of collections of problems. Consider
an algorithm that solves (Q(n)), that is, an algorithm that solves every
Q ∈ ∪+∞n=1Q(n). Such an algorithm is a polynomial-time algorithm if there is a polynomial
P such that for every positive integer n, the algorithm solves each Q ∈ Q(n) in at most
P (n) steps. In general, a polynomial-time algorithm can be usefully implemented on a
computer, an algorithm that takes an exponential number of steps cannot.
3. Euclidean Representations in R.
We now construct an algorithm that inputs a voter preference profile (I, A,R) and
outputs a Euclidean representation (X,W ) with X ∪ W = {xj}j∈J ∪ {wi}i∈I ⊆ R or
announces that no Euclidean representation in R exists.
Step 1 . First check to see that |I| ≤ (|A|2 ) + 1. This is a necessary condition, since,
if (X,W ) is a Euclidean representation in R for (I, A,R) and wb < wc it follows from
the fact that voters have distinct preferences that there must exist xp and xq such that
wb < (xp + xq)/2 < wc. Since there are
(|A|
2
)
candidate-pair midpoints, there can be at
most
(|A|
2
)
+ 1 voters.
Step 2 . Use Proposition 1 to determine whether (I, A,R) possesses a convex representation
in R. If not, (I, A,R) possesses no Euclidean representation in R. If so, construct a convex
representation X in R for (I, A,R) using the method of Ballester and Haeringer (2007) or
Bartholdi and Trick (1986).
Next, in order to establish and exploit the (limited) uniqueness of Euclidean represen-
tations in R, we need to reindex the candidates. Suppose a|A|, a|A|−1, . . . , ar+1 have been
chosen for 1 ≤ r ≤ |A|. (If r = |A|, this means the reindexing has not yet begun.) Choose
ar to satisfy
aris Ri−minimal in A− {a|A|, a|A−1|, . . . , ar+1} for some i and, if possible, such that
there exists ak with ar Ri−minimal in A− {a|A|, a|A−1|, . . . , ar+1, ak} for all i
(1)
Notice that the construction is not in general unique. By our use of (1) in the construction,
for all j, aj is Ri−minimal in {a1, a2, . . . , aj} for some i (2)
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Now partition A into t sets
{A1 = {ak1 = a1, a2, . . . , ak2−1}, A2 = {ak2 , ak2+1, . . . , ak3−1},
. . . , At = {akt , akt+1, . . . , a|A|}}
defined inductively by
k1 = 1, kl+1 is the smallest j > kl, such that aj is Ri−minimal in {a1, a2, . . . , aj} for all i
(3)
Lemma 1. If (I, A,R) has a convex representation in R and |Al| > 1, then, up to order
in R, there are exactly two convex representations in R for (I, Al, R|Al), and these two
convex representations are oppositely ordered.
Proof . Suppose |Al| > 1 and Zl = {zkl , zkl+1, . . . , zkl+1−1} (or {zkl , zkl+1, . . . , z|A|} if l =
t) is a convex representation in R for (I, Al, R|Al). Then {zkl , zkl+1} and {−zkl ,−zkl+1}
are convex representations in R for (I, {akl , akl+1}, R|{akl ,akl+1}) and they are oppositely
ordered in R. If |Al| > 2, by (2) and (3) both akl+2 and aq are Ri-minimal in
{akl , akl+1, akl+2} for some i, where aq 6= akl+2. Then, both zkl+2 and zq are extrema of
{zkl , zkl+1, zkl+2}. Therefore the order of {zkl , zkl+1} in R uniquely determines the order
of {zkl , zkl+1, zkl+2} in R. In other words, up to order in R there are exactly two convex
representations in R for (I, {akl , akl+1, akl+2}, R|{akl , akl+1, akl+2}): {zkl , zkl+1, zkl+2}
and {−zkl ,−zkl+1,−zkl+2}. Continue adding on one aj at a time until the conclusion
holds for Al
Our description of Step 3 requires the following notation. Let B = ∪|Al|>1Al. Let
Al1, Al2. . . . , Als be the subsequence of A1, A2, . . . , At containing all Al ⊆ B. For any set
Z ⊆R, let −Z = {−z: z ∈ Z}.
Step 3 . From Step 2 we have a convex representation X ⊆R for (I, A,R) and therefore
a convex representation Z ⊆R for (I, B,R|B). We will define a linear order ≤ on Z (not
in general the order inherited by Z from R under less-than-or-equal) such that the order
of candidates in every Euclidean representation in R for (I, B,R|B) agrees with ≤ or its
inverse. Clearly, this agreement condition places no restrictions on the linear order (Z,≤)
if (I, B,R|B) possesses no Euclidean representation in R.
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Let Zl1 = {zj : aj ∈ Al1}. Using Lemma 1, without loss of generality we can let ≤ on
Zl1 be the order on Zl1 inherited from R ordered by less than or equal (in short, let ≤ on
Zl1 agree with Zl1 ⊆R). By Lemma 1 we must define ≤ on Zl2 to agree with Zl2 ⊆R or
to be ordered oppositely to Zl2 ⊆R.
Question 1. Is there a Euclidean representation in R for (I, B,R|B) with Zl1 ordered by
≤, with Zl2 ordered like Zl2 ⊆R, and such that zkl1+zkl1+12 ≤ z
kl2+zkl2+1
2 ? Without loss of
generality, assume zkl1 < zkl1+1 and zkl2 < zkl2+1. By (2) and (3), choose b, c ∈ I such that
akl1Rba
kl1+1 and akl2+1Rcakl2 . A “yes” answer to Question 1 would imply akl2Rbakl2+1
and akl1+1Rcakl1 .
Question 2. Same question, but with z
kl2+zkl2+1
2 <
zkl1+zkl1+1
2 . By (2) and (3), choose
d, e ∈ I such that akl1+1Rdakl1 and akl2Reakl2+1. A “yes” answer to Question 2 would
imply akl2+1Rdakl2 and akl1Reakl1+1
If not(akl2Rbakl2+1 and akl1+1Rcakl1) and not(akl2+1Rdakl2 and akl1Reakl1+1), then
the answers to Questions 1 and 2 are “no” and “no.” There is no Euclidean representation
in R for (I, B,R|B) with Zl1 ordered by ≤ and Zl2 ordered like Zl2 ⊆R. Therefore we
adopt the only remaining alternative and define ≤ on Zl2 to be ordered oppositely to
Zl2 ⊆R. This guarantees that in every Euclidean representation in R for (I, B,R|B), the
order of Zl1 and the order of Zl2 both agree with ≤ or both agree with its inverse.
On the other hand, if akl2Rbakl2+1 and akl1+1Rcakl1 we ask a third question.
Question 3. Is there a Euclidean representation in R for (I, B,R|B) with Zl1 ordered by
≤ and Zl2 ordered oppositely to Zl2 ⊆R? If so we have zkl1 < zkl1+1 and zkl2+1 < zkl2 . If
zkl1+zkl1+1
2
≤ zkl2+zkl2+1
2
, then by akl1Rbakl1+1, akl2+1Rbakl2 , a contradiction. If
zkl2+zkl2+1
2
< z
kl1+zkl1+1
2
, then by akl2+1Rcakl2 , akl1Rcakl1+1, a contradiction.
Therefore the answer to Question 3 is “no.” We adopt the only remaining alternative
and define ≤ on Zl2 to agree with Zl2 ⊆R. This guarantees that in every Euclidean
representation in R for (I, B,R|B), the order of Zl1 and the order of Zl2 both agree with
≤ or both agree with its inverse.
The final case, akl2+1Rdakl2 and akl1Reakl1+1, similarly leads us to define ≤ on Zl2 to
agree with Zl2 ⊆R.
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Next use ≤ on Zl2 to define ≤ on Zl3, use ≤ on Zl3 to define ≤ on Zl4, etc.
Now extend ≤ on Zl1 and ≤ on Zl2 to ≤ on Zl1 ∪ Zl2 so that the order of Zl1 ∪ Zl2
in every Euclidean representation in R for (I, B,R|B) agrees with ≤ on Zl1 ∪ Zl2 or its
inverse as follows. By (2), (3) and the fact that a candidate least preferred by any voter
must give rise to an extremum of a convex representation, zkl2 and zkl2+1 must be extrema
of ≤ on Zl1∪{zkl2 , zkl2+1}; otherwise ≤ on Zl1∪{zkl2 , zkl2+1} cannot agree with the order
of Zl1 ∪{zkl2 , zkl2+1} in a convex representation in R for (I, B,R|B), and therefore cannot
agree with the order in a Euclidean representation in R for (I, B,R|B). Then ≤ on Zl1 and
on Zl2 determines ≤ on Zl1 ∪ {zkl2 , zkl2+1}. If |Al2| ≥ 3, zkl2+2 and either zkl2 or zkl2+1
must be extrema of ≤ on Zl1∪{zkl2 , zkl2+1, zkl3+1} so that ≤ on Zl1 and on Zl2 determines
≤ on Zl1∪{zkl2 , zkl2+1, zkl2+2}. Continuing in this way, we define ≤ on Zl1∪Zl2, then use
≤ on Zl2 and Zl3 to define ≤ on Zl1 ∪ Zl2 ∪ Zl3, etc. We pass the linear order (Z,≤) to
Step 4, considering Z as simply an abstract set on which a linear order has been defined.
Step 4. From Step 3 we have Z = {zj : aj ∈ B} and a linear order ≤ on Z such that the
order of candidates in every Euclidean representation in R for (I, B,R|B) agrees with ≤
or its inverse. We now want to think of Z as a subset of R that is not completely specified,
but such that the order of Z in R is in agreement with the linear order ≤ defined in Step 3.
We can completely specify Z and also define W = {w1, w2, . . . , w|I|} ⊆R so that (Z,W )
is a Euclidean representation in R for (I, B,R|B) if and only if there is a solution in real
values to the following system of linear inequalities:
(1) all inequalities zp < zq from the given linear order (Z,≤), passed from Step 3 and
(2) (z
r+zs)
2 <
(zp+zq)
2 if z
p, zq, zr, zs ∈ Z, zp < zq, zr < zs and there exists b ∈ I such that
zpRbz
q and zsRbzr.
If a solution Z exists, W is defined from Z as follows, If b ∈ I, zp, zq ∈ Z and zp < zq,
then wb < z
p+zq
2 if z
pRbz
q and wb > z
p+zq
2 if z
qRbz
p.
Notice that the number of unknowns in the system of inequalities defining Z is
|B| ≤ |A| and the number of inequalities is less than |B|2+|I||B|4 ≤ |B|2+((|B|2 )+1)|B|4 ≤
|B|6 ≤ |A|6
At the end of Step 4, we have arrived at one of two possible outcomes.
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The first possibility is that we have concluded that there is no Euclidean representation
in R for (I, B,R|B) in which the order of candidates agrees with the linear order on Z
defined in Step 3. Then by Step 3, there is no Euclidean representation inR for (I, B,R|B),
which implies there is no Euclidean representation in R for (I, A,R).
The second possibility is that we have constructed a Euclidean representation (Z,W )
in R for (I, B,R|B).
We will use the following fact to extend (Z,W ) to a Euclidean representation in R
for (I, A,R).
Lemma 2. Suppose (I, A,R) has a convex representation in R, i ∈ I, |Al| = 1, Al 6= Am
and ar ∈ Am. Then arRiakl if and only if m < l.
Proof . By (3) akl is Ri-minimal in {a1, a2, . . . , akl}. If m < l, then r < kl so that arRiakl .
Now suppose there exists r, l,m ≤ |A| and b ∈ I with ar ∈ Am, l < m and arRbakl .
Further, suppose r is the minimal such integer. By (2) ar is Rc-minimal in {a1, a2, . . . , ar}
for some c ∈ I. Since kl+1 ≤ r and since aklRiakl+1 for all i, (which follows from (3)) akl is
not Rb-minimal in {a1, a2, . . . , ar}. Therefore there exists p with kl < p < r such that ap
is Rb-minimal in {a1, a2, . . . , ar} and aklRcap by the minimality of r. Since aklRcapRcar,
there must be q with kl < q < r and q 6= p such that aklRcapRcaqRcar for some c. If
there were no such q for all c with apRcar, we could not have p < r by (1). We also have
aklRba
q by the minimality of r.
We now have aklRcapRcaqRcar and arRbaklRbaqRbap. Setting kl = s, these expres-
sions say (I, A,R) is 2-4 twisted, which together with Proposition 1 contradicts the convex
representability in R of (I, A,R).
Step 5 . From Step 4 we have a Euclidean representation (Z,W ) in R for (I, B,R|B), which
we now use to construct a Euclidean representation (X,W ), in R for (I, A,R). Suppose
|Al| = 1. We may have l < m for all Am ⊆ B, l > m for all Am ⊆ B, or m < l < n for
some m,n with Am, An ⊆ B. We will deal with the third case, which is the most difficult.
By Lemma 2, if ap ∈ Am, aq ∈ An and m < l < n, then apRiaklRiaq for all i ∈ I. We
first construct Y ⊆ R by setting yp = zp for ap ∈ B such that p < kl; by setting yq > zq
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if q > kl and zq > zp for ap ∈ B such that p < kl; and by setting yq < zq if q > kl and
zq < zp for ap ∈ B such that p < kl.
If in addition we construct Y so that |yq−zq| = |yr−zr| whenever yq 6= zq and yr 6= zr,
then (Y,W ) will be a Euclidean representation in R for (I, B,R|B), since (y
q+yr)
2 =
(zq+zr)
2
if yq > zq and yr < zr or if yq = zq and yr = zr, and since in any other case yq, yr and
(yq+yr)
2
will be in the same direction from each voter as were zq, zr and (z
q+zr)
2
, respectively.
Finally, if |yq−zq| is chosen large enough whenever yq 6= zq, then we can define ykl by
placing it between {yp: yp = zp} and {yp: yp > zp} (or {yp: yp < zp} if we prefer), in such
a way that (Y ∪{ykl},W ) is a Euclidean representation in R for (I, B ∪{akl}, R|B∪{akl}).
Continuing to treat one akl at a time in this manner, we arrive at (X,W ) = (Y ∪{ykl : |Al| =
1},W ), a Euclidean representation in R for (I, A,R).
It is easy to see that Steps 1, 3 and 5 of our algorithm are accomplished in polynomial
time, that is, in a number of steps that is polynomial in |A|. Bartholdi and Trick (1986)
proved that Step 2 can be acccomplished in polynomial time. We discuss Step 4 in Section
5.
Finally by our construction, the number of distinct Euclidean representations in R
for a given representable (I, A,R), where two representations are distinct if they order the
candidates differently, is 2|A−B−A1|+δ where δ =
{
1 if B 6= ∅
0 if B = ∅
5. Concluding Remarks: Linear Programming.
We note that our application of linear programming is somewhat unusual. Gale (2007)
points out that almost all linear programming applications concern consumption or pro-
duction problems; that is, they involve optimizing over a set of processes that consume or
produce a set of goods.
Concerning the complexity of linear programming problems, it is well known that in
practice the famous simplex method solves linear programming problems relatively quickly.
Borgwardt (1982) and Smale (1983) proved that the average number of steps required by
the simplex method is polynomial. However, Klee and Minty (1972) had already demon-
strated that for worst-case examples, the simplex method requires an exponential number
of steps. Fortunately, Khachiyan (1980) demonstrated that the ellipsoidal method does in
10
fact solve linear programming problems in polynomial time. Since we have a polynomial-
time reduction of our problem, determining whether a Euclidean representation in R exists
and if so constructing one, to a linear programming problem, and since linear programming
problems are solvable in polynomial time, our problem is solvable in polynomial time.
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